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ABSTRACT 
 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is a milestone in the 
fight against impunity. However, the expectations for what the ICC 
can achieve have often been distorted. Thus, the main research 
question of this Article is: what exactly is the role of the ICC within 
transitional justice efforts? My answer consists of three parts. First, 
there is a need to delimit the ICC’s mandate, namely, what it means to 
be an international criminal tribunal as opposed to other international 
bodies, and how the ICC is embedded in a system which includes the 
States Parties to the ICC Statute. Second, academics and practitioners 
need to bear in mind that only few perpetrators (the “persons most 
responsible”) are prosecuted and tried by the ICC. Third, the ICC 
must be put in context: the ICC is a tool of both justice and peace, but 
within other transitional justice options that may involve amnesties. 
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The conclusions are three-fold: first, there is a need to keep in mind 
the ICC’s mandate as an international criminal tribunal and thus 
limited to the determination of criminal liability of those accused of 
crimes under its jurisdiction. Second, the difference between the 
“situation” and “case” notions is necessary to identify how much 
governmental/state attitudes towards the ICC may change. Finally, 
notions of peace and justice should be understood broadly and jointly 
to better situate the ICC’s role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of the ICC is, undoubtedly, a milestone in the 
international criminal justice fight against impunity. This arguably 
corresponds to four main reasons. First, the ICC consolidates a long 
path of international criminal justice started by the International 
Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, and followed by the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
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and Rwanda (“ICTR”).1 Second, the domestic implementation of the 
ICC Statute has had a direct impact on the importance and manner to 
fight impunity, and, at least partially, has inspired new mechanisms, 
such as the hybrid criminal tribunals.2 Third, unlike previous 
international criminal tribunals, the ICC is the first that allows victims 
of the most serious international crimes to directly participate in the 
proceedings. Not only can they intervene as witnesses, but they can 
also voice their own views and concerns, including the possibility of 
receiving reparations.3 Fourth, the ICC is an important transitional 
justice mechanism.4 Due to its intended universal dimension, and its 
character as the first permanent international criminal court, the ICC 
may have a major impact on other transitional justice mechanisms in 
diverse societies across the globe.   
With this as the foundation for the ICC’s ability and reach, 
expectations have raised to the point of being distorted. This Article 
proposes that this confusion has stemmed from two directions. From 
one direction, the ICC has been unduly perceived as a sort of panacea 
 
1. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (3rd 
ed., 2008) (discussing international criminal law and international/hybrid criminal 
courts generally); MORTEN BERGSMO ET. AL., HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2017); WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1–22 (5th ed., 2017); CRYER ET AL., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 113–202 (4th 
ed., 2019). 
2. See generally MAX DU PLESSIS, UNABLE OR UNWILLING? CASE STUDIES ON 
DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICC STATUTE IN SELECTED AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES (Max du Plessis & Jolyon Ford eds., 2008); OVO CATHERINE 
IMOEDEMHE, THE COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IN AFRICA 55–87 (2016); Daley Birkett, 
Twenty Years of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Appraising 
the State of National Implementing Legislation in Asia, 18 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 353, 
353–392 (2019). 
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute] (discussing reparations in arts. 75 and 
79). 
4. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor and Uchechukwu Ngwaba, The International 
Criminal Court as a “Transitional Justice” Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical 
Reflections, 9 INT’L J. TRANS. J. 90, 90–108 (2015); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Bespoke 
transitional justice at the International Criminal Court, in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE 
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS 106, 
106–121 (Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, & Carsten Stahn eds., 2015).   
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aimed at solving the whole package of transitional justice problems, 
which neglects or minimizes the existence of other transitional justice 
mechanisms.5 From the other, the ICC has been portrayed as a threat 
to peace-making processes.6 This negative depiction is explained via 
diverse motivations ranging from the legitimate, such as concerns 
about the fate of victims in ongoing armed conflicts, to the illegitimate 
and ill-intentioned, which is exemplified by the reactions of certain 
governments when the ICC targets some of their highest officers.   
Against this general background, this Article aims to address this 
main research question: what is the exact role of the ICC within 
transitional justice efforts? This Article’s answer consists of three 
main parts, which constitute the sections of the present article. First, 
there is a need for a precise delimitation of the ICC’s mandate. 
Namely, what it means to be an international criminal tribunal as 
opposed to other international organizations such as human rights 
monitoring bodies or international peace and security organs, and how 
the ICC is embedded in a system which includes the States Parties to 
the ICC Statute as important actors. Second, there is a need to discuss 
a point that only a handful of perpetrators, the so-called “persons most 
responsible”, are prosecuted and tried by the ICC. Third, the big 
picture must be seen. The ICC does not exist in a void; it is a tool of 
both justice and peace, but within a set of other transitional justice 
options, which may include even the controversial grant of amnesties. 
Concerning the methodology employed herein, the present article 
primarily relies on a legal analysis, which is complemented with the 
examination of factors such as policy considerations. 
I. DELIMITATION OF THE MANDATE OF THE ICC 
A. The ICC as an International Criminal Tribunal 
This sub-section details the ICC’s mandate and emphasizes the 
nature of the ICC as an international criminal tribunal. The ICC differs 
from human rights monitoring mechanisms or international bodies 
trusted with international peace and security such as the UN Security 
 
5. See id. (for further discussion of the transnational justice mechanism). 
6. See Bartłomiej Krzan, International Criminal Court Facing the Peace vs. 
Justice Dilemma, 2 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 81, 81–88 (2016) (discussing perceptions of 
ICC as a threat to peacemaking). 
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Council. The object and purpose of the ICC Statute is indicated in the 
Preamble of the said instrument: “Determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes [the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”7 This phrasing is also 
contained in Article 1 of the ICC Statute: “[the ICC] shall have the 
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall 
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”8   
The mandate of the ICC and, particularly, its Office of the 
Prosecutor (“ICC-OTP”), has been identified in the ICC-OTP’s policy 
papers. With regard to the meaning of “genuine” proceedings, which 
is mentioned in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, ICC-OTP’s 2003 
informal expert paper,9 emphasized the importance for the states 
participating in the 1998 Diplomatic Conference of Rome that: 
“proceedings cannot be found ‘non-genuine’ simply because of . . . a 
lack of full compliance with all human rights standards.”10 The 
current phrasing was adopted after terms such as “effectively” were 
rejected because several delegations were concerned about that the 
ICC may judge a legal system in light of a “perfectionist” standard,11 
which corresponds to human rights monitoring bodies. The ICC-
OTP’s informal expert paper concluded that the applicable standard to 
show inability should be stringent: “the ICC is not a human rights 
monitoring body, and its role is not to ensure perfect procedures and 
compliance with all international standards.”12 This conclusion is 
consistent with the nature of “complementarity,” which addresses the 
question of whether a state is unable or unwilling to genuinely carry 
out proceedings.13 For example, arguments put forward by some 
 
7. ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., ¶ 5. 
8. Id. art. 1. 
9. INT’L CRIM. CT. – OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: 
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2003) [hereinafter ICC-OTP, 
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER]. 
10. Id. at 8. 
11. Id. at 8 n.9. 
12. Id. at 15. 
13. Frank Wilczek, The Mind-Expanding Power of Complementarity, SCI. AM. 
(Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-mind-expanding-
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human rights organizations claim Uganda’s legal system lacks 
capacity and impartiality.14 
This analysis is also connected with the wording of Article 17 of 
the ICC Statute, which mentions admissibility of a “case,” but not the 
broader notion of a “situation.”15 In other words, the ICC is not 
expected to take a detailed look at state’s legal system as a whole 
because this does not correspond to the mandate of an international 
criminal tribunal. The standard to assess genuineness should be 
consistent with the nature of the ICC, which is not a human rights 
body or court and is not mandated to determine all the imperfections 
of a national legal system.16 
As the ICC-OTP’s informal expert paper points out, the 
admissibility assessment of cases includes both a normative dimension 
(understanding of legislation, case-law, and procedures) and an 
empirical dimension (evaluation of the actual handling of relevant 
cases).17 Such a general assessment differs substantially from those 
used by human rights monitoring bodies. Human rights monitoring 
bodies use concrete recommendations on the extent of a state’s 
fulfillment of its international human rights obligations are the 
outcome. Although the ICC is not a human rights monitoring body or 
court, human rights standards may be useful to evaluate whether 
proceedings are being genuinely conducted within the ICC’s mandate. 
Thus, the ICC may consider contextual information and/or human 
rights concepts such as due process, the state obligation to 
respect/protect human rights, the right to an effective remedy, and the 
exhaustion of effective and local remedies.18 Nevertheless, the case 
law of human rights bodies and human rights courts should be 
approached with caution and should not be extrapolated mechanically 
to the realm of complementarity under the ICC Statute’s jurisdiction. 
 
power-of-complementarity/ (discussing how complementarity is viewing a scenario 
from multiple perspectives). 
14. See MICHAEL OTIM AND MARIEKE WIERDA, UGANDA: IMPACT OF THE 
ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010). 
15. See infra Section III.A (distinguishing between “situations” and “cases”). 
16. See ICC-OTP, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 9, at 16. 
17. Id. at 9. 
18. See id. at 28 (specifically, Annex 4, which is a list of indicia of 
unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out proceedings).   
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Moreover, the ICC establishes individual criminal responsibility,19 
and not state responsibility for violations of treaty obligations which is 
determined by human rights courts. 
The importance of this distinction may be illustrated through the 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan. The African Union (“AU”) mandated the 
AU Commission, “in consultation with the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“ACtPHR”) to examine the implications of the Court 
being empowered to try serious crimes fighting impunity.”20 
Notwithstanding the important role held by regional human rights 
courts, the ICC Statute did not anticipate the exercise of those regional 
courts’ criminal jurisdiction over crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
which deals with state complementarity.21 Similarly, there is not 
confidence that the ACtPHR has the capacity to implement that 
function.22 This view distinguishing the bodies from one another is 
relevant when assessing the legality of amnesties and which body has 
jurisdiction. In the former, the question is whether perpetrators are 
entitled to use amnesties to shield themselves from investigation and 
prosecution; in the latter, states’ violations of international obligations 
by introducing amnesties have to be determined.23 The specific matter 
of the ICC vis-à-vis amnesties is discussed later.24 
Regarding international peace and security, the UN Security 
Council is the primary stakeholder due to its mandate under Article 24 
of the UN Charter, which tasks the Security Council with deciding 
whether peace negotiations temporarily prevail over justice.25 The 
ICC Statute recognizes such a role under Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute, which states an investigation or prosecution cannot be 
commenced or proceeded for a renewable period of twelve months 
 
19. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 25. 
20. African Union [AU] Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at 5–6, Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13 (XIII) (Jul. 1–3, 2009).   
21. MARIEKE WIERDA, STOCKTAKING: COMPLEMENTARITY 5 (2010). 
22. ID. 
23. See Louise Mallinder, Can Amnesties and International Justice be 
Reconciled? 1 INT. J.  TRANSITIONAL JUS. 208, 210 (2007). 
24. See infra Section IV.B. 
25. U.N. Charter, art 24. 
7
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provided that: “the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested [such 
effect].”26 Although this provision may be criticized as an intrusion 
into justice and the ICC’s independence, it reflects the complementary 
but differentiated mandate of the ICC versus that of the Security 
Council. Under Article 16, the peace-justice question is thus dealt with 
by an external actor,27 namely, the Security Council. Human Rights 
Watch noted that the Security Council’s deferral power is: “the only 
means by which the Rome Statute explicitly permits concerns about a 
peace process to ‘trump’ prosecutorial efforts.”28 
For instance, concerning whether the arrest warrants issued 
against the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) 
constituted an obstacle to move forward in peace negotiations in 
Uganda, Article 16 could have been applied. This would have 
prevented unnecessary pressure on the ICC to withdraw those arrest 
warrants. Gareth Evans (former Head of the International Crisis 
Group) opined a similar sentiment when he identified the ICC’s 
concrete mandate: 
The prosecutor’s job is to prosecute and he should get on with it 
with bulldog intensity. If a policy decision needs to be made . . . it 
should be made by . . . those with the political and conflict 
resolution mandate, and that is the Security Council. The Statute 
allows for this in Article 16.29 
Accordingly, deference to the Security Council would circumvent 
potential impasses when peacemaking should prevail over justice. It 
 
26. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16. 
27. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PURSUING 
JUSTICE IN ONGOING CONFLICT: A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT PRACTICE 12 (May 
2007), https://www.ictj.org/publication/pursuing-justice-ongoing-conflict-
discussion-current-practice [hereinafter ICTJ]. 
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE MEANING OF “THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” 




29. International Criminal Court Newsletter No. 9, INT’L CRIM. CT., 5 (Oct. 
2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A553E1FB-3662-497E-B06E-
5B089B22D01B/278464/ICCNL9200610_En.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
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may be further argued that should the ICC Prosecutor ground his/her 
decisions mainly on peace and justice considerations, he/she would act 
ultra vires30 because Article 16 of the ICC Statute expressly grants 
such a power to the Security Council.31 
Unfortunately, several actors have ignored such a difference in 
mandates. This point is illustrated via the critical question posed by 
the ICC on whether protection, in ongoing armed conflicts, should 
embrace not only individuals who will testify before the ICC but also 
those broad populations impacted by the ICC’s actions. To answer 
this, the ICC requested the opinion of Professor Antonio Cassese, who 
headed the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. Cassese 
adopted an excessively broad approach that is at odds with the ICC’s 
mandate. He concluded that the ICC’s obligation to protect would go 
“beyond the proper scope of trial proceedings and is more 
humanitarian in nature . . . .”32 As the ICC-OTP correctly argued, this 
would obligate the ICC-OTP or the ICC Chambers to enhance security 
for victims in Darfur, which lacks a statutory basis.33 Although the 
ICC should indirectly contribute to the protection and security of the 
affected civilian populations, such a responsibility corresponds to the 
respective state(s) and/or other actors, including the UN Security 
Council or the AU. In practice, the ICC cannot feasibly handle the 
protection and security of all the victims of the ICC country situations 
because of both the ICC’s mandate and limited resources. 
Concerning the interpretation of the expression “interests of 
justice,”34 which may be considered by the ICC’s Prosecutor when 
 
30.  Ultra vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (19th ed. 2019) (“Unauthorized; 
beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.”). 
31. JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 383 
(2008). 
32. Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Observations on Issues 
Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Prevention of Evidence in the 
Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the ICC, ¶ 2 (Aug. 25, 2006), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02007.PDF. 
33. Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor’s Response to 
Cassese’s Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the 
Prevention of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the ICC, ¶ 16 
(Sep. 11, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02009.PDF. 
34. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53. 
9
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deciding whether to initiate an investigation and prosecution, the ICC-
OTP has interpreted the scope of “interests of justice” by juxtaposing 
it with interests of “peace”: “the broader matter of international peace 
and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within 
the mandate of other institutions.”35 Thus, the ICC Prosecutor has 
positioned himself/herself as an advocate for justice and he/she has 
not dialectically engaged with peace and justice. The ICC-OTP has 
seemingly left other institutions and bodies the mandate or mission to 
pursue peace-related interests. 
This approach is consistent and compatible with the mandate of 
the ICC (ICC-OTP included), and is also underlain by the ICC 
Prosecutor’s self-perception as a judicial rather than a political actor. 
The first ICC-Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stated that: “as the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, I was given a clear judicial mandate. My duty 
is to apply the law without political considerations. I will present 
evidence to the Judges and they will decide on the merits of such 
evidence.”36 The current ICC-Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has also 
expressed that the ICC-OTP: “cannot yield to political considerations 
or adapt its work according to the peace negotiations timetable. It 
must always conduct its work on the basis of the law and of the 
evidence.”37 Such a standing follows the path paved by the former 
ICTY/ICTR Prosecutors Richard Goldstone and Louise Arbour, who 
rejected political considerations while exercising their prosecutorial 
discretion.38 This approach may be nuanced by future ICC Prosecutors 
 
35. INT’L CRIM. CT. – OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 2 (September 2007). 
36. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Address at “Building a 
Future on Peace and Justice” Conference Nuremberg, at 3 (Jun. 24–25, 2007), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-
005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf.   
37. Fatou Bensouda, Reflections from the International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 505, 510 (2012). 
38. Martin Macpherson, Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court: Comments on the concept of the interests of justice, 
Amnesty International Index: IOR 40/023/2005, 17 June 2005, p. 13, 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/84000/ior400232005en.pdf 
(Golstone said: “C’est pourquoi nous avons à juger les responsables quels qu’ils 
soient et quelles que soient les conséquences politiques qui pourraient s’ensuivre. 
Ces éventuelles consequences ne sont pas notre souci.” Translated as: “This is why 
we have to judge those responsible regardless of whom they are or regardless of the 
10
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who may adopt a holistic approach; however, the limit should be 
marked by attempts to find a balance between justice and peace.39 In 
any event, this Article sustains that the ICC Prosecutor should not 
mechanically privilege peace or security over justice because this falls 
short of the ICC’s mandate. 
B. Positive Complementarity and its Limits 
Expectations about the ICC’s mandate have also been 
unnecessarily exacerbated due to some myopia that has prevented 
actors from seeing the ICC as only a part, albeit an important part, of 
the “Rome System of Justice”, which also includes the State Parties to 
the ICC Statute.40 Underlying this system is the idea of “positive 
complementarity”: the ICC should not merely step in when national 
courts fail to investigate or prosecute, but do so actively and 
encourage national prosecutions of crimes that fall within the ICC’s 
material jurisdiction.41 This approach has been adopted by the ICC-
OTP. In a former ICC-Prosecutor’s words: “As a consequence of 
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not 
be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of 
national institutions would be a major success.”42 The current ICC-
Prosecutor similarly considers positive complementarity as: “a 
 
political consequences which may ensue. Those eventual political consequences are 
not our concern”); see also Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Arbour, Milosevic 
and “Yesterday’s Men”: Tribunal Update 128: Last Week in The Hague (May 31 – 
Jun. 5, 1999) (Jun. 5, 1999), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/arbour-milosevic-and-
yesterdays-men (In turn, Arbour remarked: “I don’t think it’s appropriate for 
politicians  . . .  to reflect on whether the indictment came at good or at a bad time; 
whether it’s helpful to legal process. This is a legal, judicial process.”). 
39. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 665–67 (2010).   
40. See William Burke-White, Implementing a Policy of Positive 
Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice, 19 CRIM. L. F. 59, 61 (2008). 
41. See id. at 60. 
42. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement at the 
Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, The 
Hague (Jun. 16, 2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D7572226-264A-
4B6B-85E3-2673648B4896/143585/030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
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proactive policy of cooperation and consultation, aimed at promoting 
national proceedings and at positioning itself . . . ready to intervene in 
the event of unwillingness or inability by national authorities.”43   
The two components of the Rome System of Justice are intended 
to contribute towards the goal of ending impunity.44 The States Parties 
to the ICC Statute clearly play an important role as identified in the 
ICC Preamble, which refers to the state duty “to exercise . . . criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”45 This 
wording reflects the spirit of the ICC Statute because states are 
expected to carry the main burden of investigation and prosecution.46   
In this context, the ICC possesses a secondary competence to 
exercise jurisdiction over international crimes only when States are 
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate/prosecute crimes under 
the ICC’s jurisdiction. The ICC’s mandate is only a component of the 
Rome System of Justice that may be better grasped if one takes into 
account the system as a whole in light of the idea of positive 
complementary—even if the ICC Statute mentions neither of them 
explicitly. Viewing the system in such a way may prevent the ICC 
being overburdened with tasks that largely exceed its mandate.   
Nevertheless, the adoption of a “positive complementarity” 
approach is not imposed on the ICC because there is no explicit ICC 
Statute provision detailing such an obligation. As the ICC-OTP’s 
informal expert paper details, positive complementarity implies 
partnership and dialogue with states, and the ICC-Prosecutor, within 
his/her mandate, and without any obligation, can “encourage the State 
concerned to initiate national proceedings, help develop cooperative 
anti-impunity strategies, and possibly provide advice and certain 
forms of assistance to facilitate national efforts.”47 The “positive 
complementarity” notion may also include scenarios where there is a 
consensual division of labor between the ICC and the respective 
state.48 For example, while the persons most responsible are 
prosecuted and tried by the ICC, lesser perpetrators are handled by 
 
43. Bensouda, supra note 37, 507. 
44. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., ¶ 5. 
45. Id. pmbl., ¶ 6. 
46. ICC-OTP, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 9, at 3 n.24. 
47. Id. at 4. 
48. See id. at 19. 
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national jurisdiction(s). Clearly noting these inherent limits will 
prevent expectations from becoming over-inflated. The last point is 
fleshed out in three scenarios as follows. 
First, when positive complementarity concerns states that are 
unwilling to prosecute international crimes even when the respective 
state is able to do so, the ICC’s most efficient manner to push an 
unwilling state to exercise its jurisdiction is to make it clear that this 
state’s decision not to investigate/prosecute will very likely trigger the 
ICC’s intervention.49 This should lead to a state to consider national 
investigation/prosecution as a better option than the ICC’s 
intervention, especially in terms of state sovereignty. Such pressure, 
which is built up on a credible threat of ICC’s investigation, should be 
backed up by a strong record of ICC’s investigation into and 
prosecution of crimes. A direct and explicit dialogue between the ICC 
and states “may make the threat of international prosecution more 
poignant and thereby encourage national prosecution.”50 The ICC-
OTP may actively monitor potential crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, alerting the respective state(s) of the existence of such 
crimes in case the state may have been unaware thereof. In order not 
to jeopardize the ICC’s scarce resources and maximize the impact of 
such monitoring, this action should be implemented in association 
with non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and/or international 
organizations. 
Second, when positive complementarity concerns states which are 
unable to prosecute international crimes, as William Burke-White 
points out, two considerations should be taken into account.51 The first 
consideration is that existing international criminal tribunals have 
exhibited limited success in judicial reform efforts.52 Such a hurdle 
may be stronger in the case of the ICC due to its broad jurisdiction, 
and the ICC (and ICC-OTP) spreads its resources more broadly than 
an ad hoc or a hybrid criminal court would do. The second 
consideration is that those efforts may have implications for 
 
49. Burke-White, supra note 40, at 71. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 76–77. 
52. Id. 
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subsequent admissibility challenges.53 Any ICC’s/ICC-OTP’s 
assistance may have a direct impact on the analysis of the genuineness 
of national proceedings. This could cause a state, or accused, to 
invoke the ICC’s assistance to challenge the admissibility of a case if 
the ICC decides to investigate or prosecute it. This potential risk may 
be controlled with the ICC’s appropriate vigilance.54 It would also 
consist of partnership with an unable state, understood as not blocking 
the obligations and capability of the ICC-OTP to gather information in 
order to verify the genuine conduction of national proceedings, and 
thus be “consistent with the presumption of bona fides toward 
cooperative [but unable] States, the OTP proceed with a positive, 
cooperative approach, albeit with some caution to avoid being 
exploited in efforts to legitimize or shield inadequate efforts from 
criticism.”55 
An example of the “unable” state scenario was the Prosecutor’s 
decision to open an investigation in the Central African Republic 
(“CAR”). The CAR’s government self-referred the CAR’s situation to 
the ICC based mainly on a decision of the CAR’s Cour de Cassation 
(CAR’s highest judicial body), in which the Cour found the national 
justice system to be unable to investigate and prosecute the alleged 
crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.56 Whether these findings should 
be decisive for the ICC-Prosecutor’s decision to step in is uncertain. If 
so, there is an undeniable risk that some states may divert their 
judicial workload and inappropriately allocate it to the ICC. 
Therefore, the ICC Prosecutor should approach these decisions more 
autonomously and objectively. As William Schabas remarked, the 
Prosecutor’s discretion should not be excessively broad and the ICC 
 
53. Id. 
54. ICC-OTP, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 9, at 4.   
55. Id. at 7.   
56. See generally Situation in the Central African Republic, Case No. ICC-
01/05-1, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary 
Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic (Nov. 30, 2006), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_03776.PDF; Int’l Crim. Ct., 
Prosecutor Opens Investigation in the Central African Republic, HAGUE (May 22, 
2007), https://www.icc-, cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=prosecutor+opens+ 
investigation+in+the+central+african+republic  (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
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Chambers should not fall in “judicial activism” as this would bring 
more cases than those that the ICC can efficiently handle.57 
Third, the last scenario consists in a division of labor between the 
ICC and states. This is the case when a state does not challenge the 
admissibility of a “situation” but instead self-refers a “situation” to the 
ICC, namely, the “inaction” scenario.58 The ICC-OTP’s informal 
expert paper considered that:   
[T]o decline to exercise jurisdiction in favour of prosecution before 
the ICC is a step taken to enhance the delivery of effective justice, 
and is thus consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Rome 
Statute . . . . This is distinguishable from a failure to prosecute out 
of apathy or a desire to protect perpetrators, which may properly be 
criticized as inconsistent with fight against impunity.59 
This approach was endorsed by inter alia Trial Chamber II in 
Katanga, which, concerning the decision of the Auditeur Général of 
the Democratic Republic Congo (“DRC”) to close domestic 
proceedings against Katanga, the Chamber concluded that this 
decision was not one to not prosecute under Article 17(1)(b) of the 
Statute, but it instead was “a decision to surrender the Appellant 
[(Katanga)] to the Court and to close domestic investigations against 
him as a result of that surrender. The thrust of this decision was not 
that the Appellant should not be prosecuted, but that he should be 
prosecuted, albeit before the International Criminal Court.”60 The 
division of labor between the ICC (investigation/prosecution of the 
most responsible individuals) and national mechanisms (dealing with 
the rest of perpetrators using transitional justice tools including 
investigation/prosecution) is in principle coherent with the ideas of the 
Rome System of Justice—and positive complementarity. 
 
57. See William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 755–57 (2008). 
58. Id. 
59. ICC-OTP, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 9, at 8 n.24. 
60. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment 
on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber 
II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ¶ 82 (Sep. 25, 2009), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_06998.PDF. 
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However, self-referrals should not be excessively relied upon, 
especially when a state is able and willing to investigate and 
prosecute. For instance, some critiques have been raised as to whether 
the Situation in Uganda and the Situation in the DRC really merited 
the use of ICC’s resources. According to some reports, the Situation in 
Uganda seemingly did not fulfill the “inability” requirement under 
Article 17 of the ICC Statute since Uganda was unable to arrest the 
suspects, but was not necessarily unable or unwilling to investigate 
and prosecute.61 This Article questions that if the real problem was 
enforcement, how can the ICC make a difference since the ICC also 
lacks—arguably to a higher degree—enforcement power? 
Moreover, unlike Uganda, the judicial system in the region of Ituri 
was destroyed at the time of the referral.62 As for the DRC, Lubanga 
and Katanga had already been in the DRC’s custody awaiting trial for 
more serious crimes when the ICC requested their surrender because 
the DRC was considered not to be investigating the crimes prosecuted 
by the ICC. Additionally, the DRC’s judicial system, at least in some 
areas of the country, was “able and willing.”63 By taking these points 
into account, one may question whether the ICC could have done 
better to encourage the DRC to take primary responsibility, and, 
therefore, the ICC should have only supported/monitored this process 
rather than to step in it.64 
These cases of “inaction” and following the approach first 
adopted by the ICC Prosecutor and then endorsed by the ICC may 
trigger an important number of cases because they can be regarded as 
a de facto waiver of complementarity.65 In turn, this may lead to an 
undesirable scenario where States Parties to the ICC Statute 
increasingly become more reluctant to investigate and prosecute, and, 
 
61. See, e.g., Uganda Department of State Background, INFOPLEASE.COM 
(Nov. 2007), https://www.infoplease.com/world/countries/state-department-
profiles/uganda-department-of-state-background (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
62. CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, IN UNCHARTED WATERS: SEEKING 
JUSTICE BEFORE THE ATROCITIES HAVE STOPPED, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT IN UGANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 15-19 (2004). 
63. See Nidal Jurdi, The Prosecutorial Interpretation of the Complementarity 
Principle: Does it Really Contribute to Ending Impunity on the National Level? 10 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 73, 94 (2010).   
64. Id. at 95. 
65. Id. 
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instead, opt for self-referrals to the ICC. Hence, should self-referrals 
not be scrutinized in a stricter manner, states willing and able to 
prosecute may take advantage of  the ICC through a type of forum 
shopping—putting an excessive burden on the ICC’s shoulders—
which, in the medium or long term, can seriously jeopardize the ICC’s 
efficiency and resources. 
To avoid a potential undue instrumentalization of the ICC, it is 
necessary for the Court to implement a thorough “willingness” and 
“ability” examination of the state in question in order to avoid a “free-
rider” scenario.66 The record of the state the ICC is considering should 
also be examined. Using this examination, a division of labor should 
be set forth and, once created, the ICC should put in place effective 
mechanisms via a permanent dialogue and coordination to ensure this 
division. 
II. ICC CASES: ONLY A HANDFUL OF PERPETRATORS WILL BE 
PROSECUTED AND TRIED AT THE ICC 
A. Difference between the Notions of “Situations” and “Cases,” and 
its Impact on Reactions of States/Governments 
The difference between the notions “situations” and “cases” is 
important because, among other reasons, several actors perceive them 
differently and respond to the ICC in kind. To trigger the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, the first step is a referral by a state or the UN Security 
Council, or by the ICC Prosecutor’s own initiative, not of an 
individual case/individual cases but of a “situation” in language of the 
ICC Statute.67 With regard to the notion of “situations”, an ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber: 
Situations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, 
territorial and in some cases personal parameters, such as the 
situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo since 
1 July 2002, entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to 
 
66. See Burke-White, supra note 40, at 84. 
67. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 13. 
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determine whether a particular situation should give rise to a 
criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such.68 
Accordingly, there are three parameters to define a “situation”: 
temporal, territorial, and personal. These parameters actually underlay 
the current “situations” before the ICC. As of January 1, 2020, five 
“situations” were triggered through self-referrals: Uganda, DRC, 
CAR, Mali, and CAR-II. Two were triggered through Security 
Council Resolutions: Darfur (Sudan). Five through the ICC 
Prosecutor’s own investigation: Kenya, Ivory Coast, Georgia, 
Burundi, and Bangladesh/Myanmar.69 Each “situation” has generated 
(or will generate) individual cases (twenty-seven in total as January 1, 
2020), which are currently in different stages ranging from 
investigation to ongoing trials to completed cases.70 
The temporal parameters of a “situation” consist in establishing a 
commencement date. For example, in most “situations” the said date 
is July 1, 2002, when the ICC entered into force. Concerning the 
ending point of the referral, the referral date might be presumed unless 
otherwise indicated.71 For instance, as for the Kenya’s “situation,” 
November 26, 2009, was set as the ending point—when the 
Prosecutor asked Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization to open an 
investigation.72 
Another point not mentioned in the ICC Statute is whether a 
“situation” can be “prospective” as well as “retroactive.” For example, 
in the Darfur’s “situation,” referred by the Security Council on March 
31, 2005, a prospective approach has been implicitly considered 
because the arrest warrant issued by a Pre-Trial Chamber against 
 
68. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, 
Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS-1, VPRS-2, 
VPRS-3, VPRS-4, VPRS-5 and VPRS-6, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006) https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01689.PDF. 
69. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Situations under Investigation, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
70. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Situations and Cases, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
71. SCHABAS, supra note 39, at 298.   
72. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01-09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_03256.PDF. 
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Omar al-Bashir (former President of Sudan) covered acts up to the 
date of the arrest warrant issuance request (July 14, 2008).73 These 
Security Council’s open-ended referrals may pose an extra burden on 
the ICC Judges. This is because they will have to determine whether 
the referred “situation” still qualifies as a threat to peace, breach of 
peace, or an act of aggression: the Security Council referrals may only 
be grounded on its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Concerning the territorial parameters of a “situation”, some 
referrals have framed a situation within a state’s territory.74 In turn, 
the Security Council referred to Darfur, an administrative region in 
Sudan. In the Situation in Uganda, the reference was a little 
ambiguous since “northern Uganda” does not correspond to a concrete 
administrative division. Moreover, that a “situation” is confined to a 
specific country may be partially questioned since most of the ICC’s 
current “situations” have regional or sub-regional dimensions, which 
exceeds narrow analyses of national jurisdictions. A holistic approach 
to transitional justice underlies this critique. As Graeme Simpson 
points out: 
[T]he ICC’s concern with the boundaries between international and 
national jurisdiction risks inhibiting its ability to integrate with 
local approaches to justice. This restriction is at least equally 
problematic in grappling with conflicts in Africa which frequently 
do not respect national boundaries in the [back then] four countries 
where the ICC is currently investigating crimes . . . In its mandate, 
investigative orientation and entire modus operandi, the ICC is 
focused on addressing national justice solutions . . . . This may 
effectively preclude investigations into the role of regional actors, 
 
73. Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, ¶ 37 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF. 
74. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04, Decision to Hold Consultation under Rule 114, 2–3 (Apr. 21, 2005), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01834.PDF. 
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representatives of neighbouring governments, or global non-state 
actors.75 
This evidences one intrinsic limit to the ICC, which justifies the 
need for not gathering excessive expectations about the ICC’s impact. 
The application of national territorial parameters may indeed cause 
some confusion in cases similar to that of Jean-Pierre Bemba where a 
DRC national and a former DRC’s Vice-president was tried as part of 
the “situation” in the CAR rather than the “situation” in the DRC. 
In some contexts, a “situation” can also be defined by personal 
parameters.76 These parameters are problematic because a situation 
should not target specific individuals or groups. There is some ICC’s 
practice on this regard. For example, whereas Uganda’s letter of 
referral to the ICC mentioned the “situation concerning the ‘Lord’s 
Resistance Army’ [(“LRA”)] in northern and western Uganda,”77 the 
ICC responded that: ‘the scope of the referral encompasses all crimes 
committed in Northern Uganda in the context of the ongoing conflict 
involving the [LRA].’”78 In turn, Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Situation 
in Kenya did not consider personal parameters, which should, in 
principle, be the trend to be followed by the ICC in order to 
distinguish clearly between situations and individual cases. 
As mentioned, individual “cases” stem from each “situation” at 
the ICC. It is important to identify when exactly the ICC case stage 
begins because, as examined later, this allows determining how states 
or governments react differently to what it is categorized as 
“situations” versus “cases”. This Article argues that whereas 
governments tend to be cooperative or non-obstructionist during the 
 
75. Graeme Simpson, One among Many: The ICC as a Tool of Justice during 
Transition, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 73, 78 
(Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
76. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 
68, ¶ 65. 
77. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to Convene a 
Status Conference on the Investigation in the Situation in Uganda in Relation to the 
Application of Article 53, ¶ 4 (Dec. 2, 2005), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01136.PDF (referring to “letter of referral by the 
Attorney General of Uganda of 16 December 2003, appended as Exhibit A to the 
Prosecutor’s application, by which the ‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army’ in northern and western Uganda was submitted to the Court”).   
78. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
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situation stage, governments tend to oppose the ICC once an 
individual case is brought, particularly when a state actor is targeted. 
Just because one or more cases are filed before the ICC does not 
end/close the respective situation as additional cases may arise later. 
The procedural moment when an individual case begins is marked by 
the ICC Prosecutor’s application to seek the issuance of an arrest 
warrant or a summons to appear by a Pre-Trial Chamber. The ICC 
Prosecutor applies for an arrest warrant/summons to appear.79 The 
Prosecutor has to include: “the name of the person,” “specific 
reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the 
person is alleged to have committed,” and “a concise statement of the 
facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes.”80 Noting the 
distinction between a situation and a case helps to better identify how 
the state government reactions may change during the two stages, as 
shown in the following examples. 
The Situation in Darfur, and related cases, is a prime example of 
the practical importance of the above-mentioned difference. Following 
the beginning of its investigation in 2005, the ICC-OTP continuously 
sought to establish a working relationship with the Sudanese 
Government, which was actually responsive for approximately two 
years.81 Accordingly, Sudan allowed ICC representatives to conduct 
five missions to Khartoum (Sudan’s capital) between 2005 and 
2007.82 Even though these missions were complementarity-oriented, 
the ICC representatives were given access to people and documents of 
interest requested by them. However, Sudan stopped cooperating in 
2007.83 There is no coincidence that this change in Sudan’s attitude 
towards the ICC corresponded to the issuance of two arrest warrants 
against Ahmed Harun, then-Sudanese Minister for Interior, and 
against Ahmed Kushayb, the leader of the state-backed militia, 
 
79. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(a). 
80. See id. art. 58, subdivs. (2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(c), (7)(a), (7)(c), (7)(d). 
81. SULIMAN BALDO, SUDAN: IMPACT OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (May 2010). 
82. See INT’L CRIM. CT. – OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, TENTH REPORT OF THE 
PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1593 ¶ 44 (2005) [hereinafter ICC-OTP, TENTH 
REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR] . 
83. Id. 
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“Janjaweed.”84 Sudan’s hostility to the ICC increased when the 
investigation and prosecution targeted senior leaders at the top of the 
chain of the command in the army and security agencies.85 
Although the ICC Prosecutor in his/her reports on Darfur to the 
Security Council has documented flaws in the Sudanese 
Government’s cooperation with the ICC since 2005, the flaws 
deepened once the arrest warrants were issued.86 This became more 
notorious when the Prosecutor applied for the arrest warrant of then-
sitting President of Sudan, Al-Bashir, in mid-July 2008.87 
Immediately afterwards, official spokespersons for President Al-
Bashir’s government as well the ruling National Congress Party 
threatened to retaliate against the humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations in Darfur.88 Such a backlash did not take place, however, 
and Sudan implemented another way to obstruct the ICC’s Darfur-
related cases: launching a comprehensive diplomatic campaign 
oriented to mobilize its political allies to press for a deferral of the 
ICC’s action in application of Article 16 of the ICC Statute using the 
argument that the arrest warrants were supposedly disrupting the 
achievement of peace in Darfur.89 Consequently, the AU, the League 
of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference issued 
statements before and after the Prosecutor’s public announcement of 
application for the arrest warrant of al-Bashir, strongly criticizing the 
ICC’s actions as destabilizing peace efforts in Darfur.90 
For over ten years, the tension between the need to implement the 
ICC arrest warrants against Al-Bashir, paired with the negative and 
 
84. Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for 
Ahmad Harun, 3 (Apr. 17, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02902.PDF; Prosecutor v. Kushayb, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 3 (Apr. 27, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02908.PDF. 
85. See ICC-OTP, TENTH REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 82. 
86. See BALDO, supra note 81, at 5. 
87. ICC Prosecutor Applies for Arrest Warrant of Al-Bashir, INT’L BAR 
ASS’N, https://www.ibanet.org/ICC_ICL_Programme/ICC_Darfur_Al_Bashir.aspx; 
see also Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF. 




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/15
EDITED_5_Update Final Regular Lead Article 1.Acevedo.Master.Spring 2021 camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/25/2021  5:57 PM 
2021]   MUCH CRY AND LITTLE WOOL? 403 
 
reluctant attitudes from African states, became an important factor in 
the deterioration of the relationship between the ICC and African 
states considered, individually and as members of the AU.91 However, 
since April 2019 Al-Bashir is no longer President of Sudan after being 
overthrown by his own people.92 In fact, he now faces a trial for 
corruption charges.93  Together, these constitute important 
developments in potentially improving the relationship between the 
ICC and African states. In turn, these developments should enable the 
implementation of the arrest warrants against Al-Bashir so that he is 
finally tried by the ICC. 
The Situation in Kenya constitutes another example of how much 
the position of a government can change towards the ICC during the 
transition from the “situation” to the “case” phase. As a result of post-
electoral violence that occurred following Kenya’s 2007 elections, the 
Prosecutor started considering information about the commission of 
crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Kenya cooperated with the ICC 
not only before the opening of the situation, e.g., the governmental 
delegation’s visit to the ICC, but also once Pre-Trial Chamber II 
(based on the request of the Prosecutor) found reasonable basis to 
believe that crimes against humanity were committed in Kenya during 
the post-election violence, and that their gravity met the ICC’s 
threshold, thereby authorizing the Prosecutor to open an 
investigation.94 Kenya’s cooperative attitude was illustrated by the 
Minister of Justice who, after the Pre-Trial Chamber II’s decision, 
affirmed the government’s commitment to cooperate with the ICC 
under Kenya’s obligations as a State Party to the ICC Statute.95 
However, the ICC Prosecutor’s subsequent applications 
requesting the issuance of summons for six prominent members of the 
 
91. See generally ILLIAS BANTEKAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
AND AFRICA (Charles Chernor Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas eds., 2017) (discussing the 
relationship between the ICC and Africa).   
92. See Omar al-Bashir: Sudan’s Ousted President, BBC NEWS, Aug. 14, 
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445. 
93. Id. 
94. See generally Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15, supra note 72. 
95. CHRISTINE ALAI AND NJONJO MUE, KENYA: IMPACT OF THE ROME 
STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010). 
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two leading Kenyan political parties—three from each side—due to 
their alleged responsibility in the commission of crimes against 
humanity,96 were opposed by the Kenyan Parliament.97 It 
overwhelmingly voted to withdraw Kenya from the ICC Statute.98 
Although the Kenyan Parliament lacked the power to directly cause 
immediate changes in relation to the ICC, its members sent a message 
to the Kenyan government to start withdrawing.99 This opposition to 
the ICC Prosecutor’s applications for summons to appear was 
explicitly voiced by members of the Executive Power.100 
After the expressed intent to withdraw, and the charges and trial 
against the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Kenyan Deputy 
President William Ruto, the relationship between the ICC and Kenya 
worsened. Despite strong declarations of intent by both the ICC and 
Kenya, the cases against Kenyatta, Ruto, and others were withdrawn 
or vacated due to the lack of sufficient evidence.101 
These Kenyan cases and the case against former Sudanese 
President Al-Bashir prompted African states to conduct a series of 
actions, individually and as part of the AU to, undermine the ICC. 
First, there was the non-enforcement of arrest warrants against Al-
Bashir when he was still President and was in South Africa, which is a 
 
96. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Press Release, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/C3D48F4D-8132-46AC-A84D-94D87F3C64C4.htm (for further 
background on alleged Kenyan responsibility in the commission of crimes against 
humanity). 
97. See Michael Onyiego, Kenya’s Politicians Look to Withdraw from ICC as 
Suspects Named, VOICE OF AM., Dec. 15, 2010, 
https://www.voanews.com/africa/kenyas-politicians-look-withdraw-icc-suspects-
named. 
98. Kenya MPs vote to leave ICC over poll violence claims, BBC NEWS, Dec. 
23, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12066667. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. (The Energy Minister, Kiraitu Murungi, said: “It is only Africans from 
former colonies who are being tried at the ICC  . . .  No American or British will be 
tried at the ICC and we should not willingly allow ourselves to return to 
colonialism.”). 
101. See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, Decision 
on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta, ¶ 4 (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_02842.PDF. 
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state party to the ICC Statute.102 Second, the discussion and proposals 
at the AU to proceed with a collective withdrawal from the ICC 
Statute.103 Third, the adoption of the so-called “Malabo Protocol” to 
establish a sort of African regional criminal court without 
acknowledging the existence of the ICC.104 
In certain circumstances, a state may decide to not wait until 
individuals are singled out by the ICC. For instance, Burundi’s 
decision to withdraw from the ICC Statute, which took effect on 
October 27, 2017,105 is directly related to the opening of the 
investigation into the Situation of Burundi, which involves crimes that 
allegedly involved the current Burundian President Pierre 
Nkurunziza.106 Finally, if the difference between “situation” and 
“case” is kept in mind, there should be more awareness of 
state/governmental attempts to manipulate the ICC to prosecute only 
political adversaries. The DRC exemplifies this point because of its 
“mixed record” cooperation with the ICC depending on the case.107 
Whereas the DRC cooperated with the ICC in Lubanga, Ntaganda 
remained at large for a while.108 This was arguably because the latter 
integrated the Congolese army while the former as a leader of the 
 
102. See, e.g., Thomas Weatherall, Inviolability Not Immunity: Re-evaluating 
the Execution of International Arrest Warrants by Domestic Authorities of Receiving 
States, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 45–76 (2019).   
103. See, e.g., AU Assembly, Decision on the International Criminal Court, at 
2, ¶6, AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec. 622 (xxviii) (Jan. 31, 2017). See generally AU 
Assembly, Decision on the International Criminal Court, at 1–4, AU Doc 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 672 (xxx) (Jan. 29, 2018). 
104. See AU Assembly, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, arts. 4–6, AU doc. 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 529 (XXIII) (June 27, 2014). 
105. See, Int’l Crim. Ct., Burundi, ICC-CPI, https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
106. Situation in Burundi, Case No. ICC-01/17-9-Red, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ¶¶ 42–43 (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_06720.PDF. 
107. Mirna Adjami and Guy Mushiata, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 
IMPACT OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (May 
2010).   
108. Int’l Crim. Ct., Case Information Sheet, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/NtagandaEng.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).   
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political/military movement Union of Congolese Patriots fought state 
forces.109 
B. Prosecution of Cases Test: the Importance of the “Persons Most 
Responsible” Criterion to Narrow Down and Select the Real Universe 
of ICC Cases 
The admissibility test, which is laid down in the ICC Statute, 
refers to cases and not to situations. Article 17 of the ICC Statute 
establishes that: “Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and 
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible 
where.”110 Accordingly, the real tension caused by the application of 
the ICC’s principle of complementarity takes place not during the 
situation stage but during the case stage (i.e., once individuals are 
identified and against whom arrest warrants/summons to appear are 
issued). 
With regard to the ICC’s work, it does not really matter in 
practice whether a state investigates and prosecutes the whole 
universe of cases concerning lower-ranked offenders or how well the 
state does so. As explained later, the real overlap between the ICC and 
domestic jurisdictions consists in a tiny portion of such a vast 
universe.111 This minuscule portion, however, holds the utmost 
importance in regards to those who are allegedly the most responsible 
for international crimes. Moreover, these individuals are generally still 
in power or, in case of non-state actors, hold enough capacity to 
destabilize a country. Thus, a state whose judiciary and/or transitional 
justice mechanisms generally exhibit impeccable standards may still 
lead to cases before the ICC if one individual, over whom the 
aforementioned overlap applies, is somehow shielded from justice. 
This should be borne in mind to prevent a misleading representation 
of what the ICC stands for and what the ICC can legally and factually 
do.   
In order to prosecute a case before the ICC, a three-pronged test 
has to be fulfilled: (1) the case involves crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction; (2) the admissibility test under Article 17 is met, (i.e., 
 
109. Id. 
110. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 17. 
111. See infra Section III.A. 
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when a state is “unwilling” or “unable” genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution plus the gravity threshold is satisfied); 
and (3) the interests of justice including, among other things, 
circumstances, such as the gravity of the crime and the perpetrator’s 
role in the alleged crime.112 
I address the above-mentioned second circumstance herein as this 
is arguably the decisive criterion to draw the line between those who 
ICC’s real targets and those who are not. First, there is a general 
reference to how other international and hybrid criminal tribunals 
have dealt with this matter. Second, the approaches followed by the 
ICC Prosecutor and the ICC Chambers are analyzed. 
The ICTY and the ICTR focus on the persons most responsible 
for international crimes. As part of the completion strategy of both 
tribunals, the Security Council in Resolution 1534 asked each ad hoc 
international tribunal: “to ensure to any such indictments concentrate 
on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the relevant tribunal.”113 Similar 
phrasing had already been contained in Rule 28(A) of the ICTY Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. With regard to hybrid criminal tribunals, 
the requirement that only those persons: “who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law” 
be prosecuted was codified in the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).114 Although the UN Secretary General 
correctly interpreted the expression “greatest responsibility” as 
prosecutorial strategy,115 the SCSL case-law showed that lesser 
offenders were neither prosecuted nor tried at the SCSL.116 This 
outcome is coherent with the limited resources that affected the SCSL 
during its existence.117 Likewise, the personal jurisdiction of the 
 
112. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c). 
113. S.C Res. 1534, ¶ 5 (Mar. 26, 2004). See generally S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 
28, 2013). 
114. S.C. Res. 1315, 2, ¶ 3 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
115. Letter from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council (Jan. 12, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/40, ¶¶ 2–3. 
116. See Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementarity and Conflicting 
Relationships between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139, 148 (2003). 
117. Id. 
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) was 
restricted to: “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who 
were most serious responsible . . . .”118 
Even though neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence contains a similar explicit provision on the 
persons most responsible for crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the 
ICC Prosecutor has adopted the policy of focusing the investigation 
and prosecution on the most responsible. In the former ICC-
Prosecutor’s own words: “the worst perpetrators, responsible for the 
worst crimes, those bearing the greatest responsibility, the organizers, 
the planners, the commanders.”119 The current ICC-Prosecutor has 
highlighted that such focused prosecution: “encourages 
marginalization of high level suspects which may lead to 
demobilization of armed groups.”120 
Further, the ICC Statute emphasizes the criterion of gravity of the 
crime to identify which cases can reach the ICC. The Preamble of the 
ICC Statute reads: “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished . . . [the 
ICC] with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.”121 Similar phrasing is included 
in Article 5 of the ICC Statute which deals with material 
jurisdiction.122 Finally, as previously mentioned, gravity is present 
under Article 17 of the ICC Statute: “[a case is inadmissible when it] 
is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”123 
The emphasis the ICC Statute places on gravity should not lead us to 
disregard the importance of “the persons most responsible” criterion, 
which is actually imbedded in gravity since “gravity” is not solely 
attached to the act constitutive of the crime  but also considers the 
level of participation of those who committed the crime.124 
 
118. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia Oct. 27, 2004, art. 2 new (Cambodia). 
119. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 36, at 4. 
120. Bensouda, supra note 37, at 510. 
121. ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., ¶¶ 4, 9. 
122. Id. art. 5. 
123. Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
124. INT’L CRIM. CT. – OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY 
ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 6–7 (Sep. 2003) [hereinafter ICC-
OTP, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES]. 
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Although the ICC-OTP has theoretically considered targeting 
individuals who are not necessarily at the highest levels of power for 
successful prosecution of those most responsible for international 
crimes, it has so far targeted only senior state and non-state 
individuals.125 Therefore, it is not expected that low- or intermediate-
ranked perpetrators be indicted since national criminal jurisdiction(s) 
should deal with them. The ICC-OTP itself acknowledges factors, 
such as logistic constraints, to limit its actions to the persons who are 
regarded as the most senior offenders.126 
However, as the Director of the Prosecutions Division of the ICC-
OTP, Fabricio Guariglia, remarked, the determination of who are the 
persons most responsible for international crimes needs to be done 
only after thoroughly analyzing all the evidence.127 The ICC-OTP has 
nuanced its position by stating that the legal threshold of ICC cases 
admissibility is not as stringent as the policy threshold of the persons 
most responsible for crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.128 
Nevertheless, the ICC-OTP itself has explicitly put in place a policy to 
focus on such offenders. In practice, only cases involving the persons 
most responsible for international crimes are prosecuted and tried by 
the ICC. The ICC-OTP has relied on the approach of positive 
complementarity, namely, it will only deal with the “big fish,” 
whereas national jurisdictions do their work concerning other 
perpetrators.129 
In any event, it would be sufficient if the ICC takes note of the 
precedent set by the relationship between the ICTY and the Bosnian 
War Crimes Chamber. If it does, the ICC may decide to implement 
mechanisms to share information concerning cases which are related 
but prosecuted at different jurisdictional forums.130 Additionally, this 
 
125. Id. at 7. 
126. Id.   
127. Fabricio Guariglia, The Selection of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 209, 215 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 
2009).   
128. Id. 
129. See ICC-OTP, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES, supra note 124, at 7–8. 
130. See WIERDA, supra note 21, at 4. 
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communication may, according to the circumstances of each situation, 
require the establishment of hybrid criminal tribunals. 
As for certain cases, the ICC-OTP has considered that: “the focus 
of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor may go wider than 
high-ranking officers, if investigation of those crimes lower down the 
chain of command is necessarily for the whole case.”131 This Article 
suggests that this finding should be interpreted as follows: 
investigation during the situation stage may include intermediate/low 
level suspects, but this is only to better build up individual cases 
against the most senior perpetrators which corresponds to the 
prosecution stage. In other words, investigation into crimes committed 
by individuals other than “the persons most responsible” (situation 
phase) is not the same as the prosecution of crimes at the ICC (case 
phase). Thus, the ICC-OTP’s policy in this point becomes clearer is 
important to avoid an excessive emphasis on legalistic interpretations 
of admissibility as “admissibility” is only an intermediate step to reach 
the decision of prosecuting and then trying someone before the ICC. 
Such an approach may also avoid misleading expectations about who 
the ICC can prosecute. 
The occasional lack of clarity from the ICC-OTP is illustrated in a 
potential situation: Colombia, which has been under a preliminary 
investigation by the ICC-OTP since 2006, involving Prosecutor’s 
official visits. The Justice and Peace Law132 has received a big deal of 
attention from the ICC-OTP, who has even qualified it as a potentially 
positive example of complementarity in practice.133 However, this law 
was criticized as not reflecting a prosecutorial strategy aimed at those 
who are the most responsible for international crimes.134 Rather, cases 
mainly concerned perpetrators related to particular incidents without 
helping to expose the liability of superiors. 
Moreover, several senior paramilitary commanders were 
extradited on drug trafficking charges to the United States in 2008-
2009.135 Therefore, the practice surrounding the first years of the said 
 
131. ICC-OTP, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES, supra note 124, at 3 
(emphasis added).   
132. See generally Law No. 975 [Congressional Decree] Jul. 25, 1999. 
133. See AMANDA LYONS & MICHAEL REED-HURTADO, COLOMBIA: IMPACT 
OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (May, 2010). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 4. 
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law arguably indicated that the ICC-OTP’s initial assessment of the 
law as a good example of complementarity in practice was 
prematurely and excessively optimistic. This seemingly contributed 
the debate over whether the situation concerning Colombia being 
excessively prolonged. Even worse, the ICC’s lack of clarity was 
arguably used by the Colombian government to politically interfere 
and shield those most responsible from justice. In the end, it does not 
matter for the ICC cases whether the Colombian Judiciary system in 
general is able and willing to investigate and prosecute 99% of cases if 
Colombia presents either unwillingness or inability to investigate 
and/or prosecute the very few cases that may overlap with the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, namely, those cases concerning the most senior leaders. 
In recent times, there have been some uncertainties and challenges 
concerning Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which belongs 
to the Transitional Justice System agreed in the revised Final Peace 
Agreement between the Colombian Government and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army 
(“FARC”).136 The opening of the Situation in Colombia at the ICC 
may still be advisable concerning those who are the most responsible 
for international crimes regardless of how impeccable the Colombia’s 
Judiciary and Colombian transitional justice mechanisms may be. 
Nevertheless, caution must guide any appraisal of the ICC’s further 
action so as not to raise “unrealistic expectations of an international 
answer to Colombia’s long-standing problems with impunity.”137 The 
very specific mandate of the ICC has to be emphasized to avoid 
misrepresentations of what this judicial institution may feasibly 
achieve within its limited powers. 
When it comes to the ICC Chambers, their position on the point 
under discussion may be qualified as not fully consistent. For instance, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I in Lubanga considered that, viewed against the 
background of the ICC Statute preamble, “gravity” contained in 
 
136. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE SPECIAL JURISDICTION 
FOR PEACE, ANALYSIS ONE YEAR AND A HALF AFTER ITS ENTRY INTO OPERATION - 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5–7 (Jun. 2019); see also UNCERTAINTY FOR COLOMBIA’S 
SPECIAL JURISDICTION FOR PEACE (JEP), RELIEFWEB (Mar. 21 2019), 
https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/uncertainty-colombia-s-special-jurisdiction-
peace-jep. 
137. LYONS & REED-HURTADO, supra note 133, at 6. 
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Article 17(1)(d) is a “key tool provided by the drafters to maximize 
the Court’s deterrent effect.”138 Pre-Trial Chamber I established that 
the ICC’s deterrent effect would be the greatest if the ICC only 
focuses on the highest ranking perpetrators and, therefore, cases 
should be initiated only against the “most senior leaders suspected of 
being the most responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”139 
The ICC Appeals Chamber considered this statement as 
“questionable” and found it difficult to understand how the deterrent 
effect could be higher if perpetrators other than leaders could not be 
brought before the Court: “It seems more logical to assume that the 
deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators is 
per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court.”140 
However, when the Appeals Chamber overruled the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s finding, it provided no guidance concerning the scope of 
article 17(1)(d).141 This caused some subsequent decisions of ICC Pre-
Trial Chambers, depicted the Appeals Chamber’s ruling, as merely an 
“obiter dictum”142 and, hence, raised doubts about the binding 
authority of the Appeals Chamber’s position.143 
Such unclear or contradictory approaches are counterproductive in 
terms of predictability or certainty, which is an element of the rule of 
law to assess the practice of any international court or institution.144 
Although I will come back to the analysis of the potential deterrent 
 
138. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, ¶ 48 (Feb. 10, 2006), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_06642.PDF. 
139. Id. ¶ 50. 
140. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, 
Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
Entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 
58”, ¶ 73 (Jul. 13, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01807.PDF 
(italics original). 
141. SCHABAS, supra note 39, at 349. 
142. Obiter dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (19th ed. 2019) (“A judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the 
decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered 
persuasive)”). 
143. SCHABAS, supra note 39, at 349. 
144. See JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59–60 (2011). 
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effect of the ICC prosecutions,145 I now discuss arguments that justify 
the standing of the Pre-Trial Chambers, namely, the focus on cases 
concerning the most senior leaders at the ICC. As determined by 
Darryl Robinson, pragmatic, legal, and moral arguments can be 
raised.146 
Regarding pragmatic arguments, Miriam Aukerman highlights 
that prosecutions “are necessarily limited and selective.”147 This 
selectivity corresponds to a scenario of a: “wake of such widespread 
guilt, [where] only a small number of even the worst perpetrators will 
ever stand trial.”148 This “[s]elective prosecution in the transitional 
justice context . . . takes place despite compelling evidence that the 
perpetrators have committed the most heinous of crimes, and have 
done so without justification.”149 Should these observations be sound 
when applied to national criminal prosecutions, this Article considers 
that, with greater reason, they are completely valid when extrapolated 
in the ICC’s context. It is well-known the financial and logistic 
limitations faced by any international criminal tribunal, the ICC 
included. Those limitations definitively constrain the ICC’s ability to 
handle cases other than those targeting those who are truly the most 
responsible for international crimes. In Graeme Simpson’s words, “no 
criminal justice system can prosecute all of those responsible.”150 This 
also applies to the ICC in order to select cases against the most senior 
leaders. 
Concerning legal arguments, the duty to prosecute in transitional 
justice arguably solely refers to the persons who are the most 
responsible for international crimes. Diane Orentlicher has remarked 
that: 
 
145. See infra Section IV.A. 
146. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth 
Commission and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 493–95 
(2003). 
147. Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework 
for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 61 (2002). 
148. Id. at 51. 
149. Id. at 53. 
150. Simpson, supra note 75, at 74. 
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[C]ustomary law would . . . not require prosecution of every person 
. . . Prosecution of those who were most responsible for designing 
and implementing a system of human rights atrocities or for 
especially notorious crimes that were emblematic of past violations 
would seemingly discharge governments’ customary law obligation 
. . . provided the criteria used to select potential defendants did not 
appear to condone or tolerate past abuses.151 
Even though this comment concerns the state obligation to 
prosecute, it may be considered as a path to avoid jurisdictional 
conflicts between the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions. In other 
words, if the states themselves are in principle obligated to prosecute 
the most responsible persons/senior leaders (and not necessarily all the 
perpetrators), the ICC, due to its complementary nature, has greater 
reason to focus solely on those perpetrators regarded as the most 
responsible individuals. Additionally, lesser perpetrators are excluded 
from the ICC’s docket as those cases are expected to be dealt with 
domestically. 
Finally, regarding moral arguments, Robinson opines that, “there 
is a significant difference between the situation of the low level-
perpetrator and those who orchestrate the crimes or who distinguish 
themselves with their sadistic enthusiasm.”152 This moral or ethical 
consideration may actually prove to be decisive in extreme scenarios 
such as the DRC where child soldiers are not only low-level 
perpetrators but also victims of war crimes of conscription, which, in 
turn, led to the trial and conviction of the most senior offenders, such 
as Lubanga at the ICC. 
 
151. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2599 (1991). 
152. Robinson, supra note 146, at 494. 
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/15
EDITED_5_Update Final Regular Lead Article 1.Acevedo.Master.Spring 2021 camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/25/2021  5:57 PM 
2021]   MUCH CRY AND LITTLE WOOL? 415 
 
III. THE ICC AS A TOOL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE BUT UNDERSTOOD IN A 
SET OF OTHER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS 
A. Peace and Justice not as Opposed but as Mutually  
Complementary Concepts153 
A necessary starting point is determining what “peace” and 
“justice” mean in the context of transitional justice mechanisms, 
which include prosecution of cases by the ICC. A large number of 
misrepresentations about the ICC exist depicting it as either a threat to 
peace-making efforts or as a panacea to solve transitional justice 
issues beyond its mandate and capability stem from the content to be 
given to the notions of “peace” and “justice.” With regard to peace, 
Graeme Simpson identifies that there is “a failure to distinguish 
between positive and negative peace”, namely, while negative peace 
“prioritise[s] ending violence in the shorter term”, positive peace 
focuses on “building more durable peace through addressing the 
underlying causes of violence.”154 
One problem exists regarding peace processes as if they were the 
be-all, end-all of the entire peace-making process.155 This means the 
adoption of a narrow-minded approach to treating “peace” only as 
negative peace. A similar problem may also exist concerning the 
notion of “justice” when justice is mistakenly perceived as solely 
prosecution, which Graeme Simpson remarks in the following terms: 
“the ICC represents one instrument in a panoply of available judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms. Justice during transition involves much 
more than punitive judicial accountability meted out through ICC 
prosecutions.”156   
 
153. U.N. General Assembly, Annex to Letter dated June 13, 2008 from the 
Permanent Representatives of Finland, Germany and Jordan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General, Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/62/885 (Jun. 19, 2008) (discussing the complementarity between peace 
and justice concepts) [hereinafter Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice].   
154. Simpson, supra note 75, at 74. See generally GRAEME SIMPSON, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (2008). 
155. Simpson, supra note 75, at 74.   
156. ID.   
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If “peace” is associated only or mainly with the notion of 
“negative peace” and, on the other one, “justice” is treated as 
synonym with prosecutions, the notions of “peace” and “justice” 
remain diametrically opposed to each other. Hence, a sound approach 
that reconciles peace and justice should adopt the notions of “positive” 
peace and “broad” justice. Thus, an approach to a peace and justice 
continuum, is sounder because “diverse accountability mechanisms 
can contribute to peace building efforts, rather than compromise them. 
In this framework, the ICC is but one mechanism among many.”157 
This continuum approach may hold special significance 
concerning the victims’ interests and voices. Both those who advocate 
the need for justice and those who stand up for peace normally claim 
to be speaking on victims’ behalf in order to strengthen their 
respective positions. However, closer attention drawn to victims’ 
perceptions would allow decision-making actors to realize that 
“peace” and “justice,” in victims’ perceptions, are not necessarily 
opposed. 
Moreover, victims’ perceptions and opinions normally evolve or 
may change because the ICC’s investigations, trials, and reparation 
implementation can jointly take many years—and there are diverse 
and interconnected political and legal developments during such long 
periods. For example, in the Lubanga case, the warrant of arrest was 
issued on February 10, 2006, the trial judgment was issued on March 
14, 2012 (confirmed in appeals on December 1, 2014), and the amount 
of Lubanga’s liability for collective reparations was set on December 
15, 2017.158 
The following conclusions relevant to this sub-section, based on 
survey analyses on perceptions of victims and their communities 
concerning the ICC conducted over ten years,159 include: (1) the need 
 
157. Id. at 75.   
158. See Int’l Crim. Ct., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Case 
Information Sheet (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/LubangaEng.pdf. 
159. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER BERKELEY LAW SCHOOL, THE 
VICTIMS’ COURT? A STUDY OF 622 VICTIM PARTICIPANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (2015).  See generally Stephen Cody & Alexa Koenig, 
Procedural Justice in Transnational Contexts, 58 VA. J. INT’L L 1, 1–29 (2018); 
PHUONG PHAM ET AL., FORGOTTEN VOICES: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON 
ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA (Jan. 2005); 
PHUONG PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS: PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SERIOUS 
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for accountability, in a higher or a lower degree, is present in all ICC 
situations regardless of considerations of peace as a more important 
priority than justice; (2) prosecutions as an important but not unique 
accountability mechanism, being considered alongside other parallel 
transitional justice options ranging from compensation to amnesties; 
(3) accountability is regarded as a factor contributing to peace and 
prevention of future violence; and (4) the ICC is perceived not only as 
a mechanism of justice but also as contributing to peace.160 The 
overall conclusion is that even members of communities affected by 
ongoing armed conflicts or situations of political instability do not 
regard justice and peace necessarily as opposed but actually as 
complementarity notions. Such a perception is stronger when one 
moves from short-term to long-term scenarios. 
Another to challenge the misrepresentation that peace and justice 
are irreconcilable notions is to evaluate how the ICC’s deterrent effect 
may actually contribute to moving forward in peace-building 
processes. This Article considers previous experiences and then 
address whether the ICC’s deterrent effect has contributed to peace. 
As a preliminary point, attention should be drawn to the constraints of 
prosecutions in transitional justice scenarios, which Miriam Aukerman 
accurately summarizes:   
Prosecutions may deter some future human rights abusers, and 
prosecutions may even have a greater deterrent value than 
alternative justice mechanisms. However, it is unlikely that post-
atrocity prosecution is the most effective way to prevent future 
 
RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA (Dec. 2007); PHUONG PHAM & PATRICK 
VINCK, TRANSITIONING TO PEACE, A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES 
ABOUT SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA (Dec. 2010); PATRICK 
VINCK ET AL., LIVING WITH FEAR: A POPULATION BASED-SURVEY ON ATTITUDES 
ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (Aug. 2008); SOUTH CONSULTING, SITUATION ANALYSIS OF 
POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AREAS, MAY 2009, 26–28; SOUTH CONSULTING, 
SITUATION ANALYSIS OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AREAS (Jan. 2010); 24 HOURS 
FOR DARFUR, DARFURIAN VOICES: DOCUMENTING DARFURIAN REFUGEES’ VIEWS 
ON ISSUES OF PEACE, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (Jul. 2010); PATRICK VINCK & 
PHUONG PHAM, BUILDING PEACE, SEEKING JUSTICE: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY 
ON ATTITUDES ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (Aug. 2010).   
160. See generally id. 
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atrocities . . . [if] the goal is to deter future human rights abusers by 
making potential abusers afraid to act, the international community 
has bigger sticks to shake than the threat of trial.161 
Therefore, the expectations about the deterrent effect of 
prosecutions, including those conducted by the ICC, should not be 
inflated.   
The ICTY provides some important lessons on impact of 
prosecutions and the timing of charging. The first example is the 
indictments of self-styled Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic, 
and General Ratko Mladic in 1995, just a few months before the 
Dayton peace negotiations. There was a lot of concern coming from 
American and European diplomats and the then-UN Secretary 
General, Boutros Ghali, about the negative impact of those 
indictments on the peace-building negotiations in Bosnia.162 
Although the breaking point in Bosnia was the American strategy 
to consider Karadzic and Mladic as useless interlocutors as opposed to 
Milosevic,163 those indictments also played a critical role. The indirect 
deterrent effect consisted of the exclusion of Karadzic and Mladic 
from the negotiation process, which facilitated the participation of the 
Bosnia’s Muslim-led government.164 With the benefit of hindsight, it 
is apparent that the indictments did not, at minimum, disrupt the peace 
negotiation process in Bosnia. 
The second example is the indictment of Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 during the NATO’s Operation Allied 
Force.165 Although the indictment seemingly had little impact on 
Milosevic’s decisions during the armed conflict, he later agreed on a 
ceasefire with the UN’s governance of Kosovo supported by NATO 
troops without the promise of amnesty for him. Even though a set of 
factors, including international pressure, pushed Milosevic to take that 
decision, the indictment seemingly was one of those factors. 
 
161. Aukerman, supra note 147, at 70–71. 
162. See RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR 
CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 103 (2000). 
163. See ICTJ, supra note 27, at 2–4. 
164. GOLDSTONE, supra note 162, at 103. 
165. Slobodon Milosevic Trial – the Prosecution’s Case, U.N. INT’L RESIDUAL 
MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIB., https://www.icty.org/en/content/slobodan-
milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87-trial-prosecutions-case (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
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Moreover, the deterrent effect of the indictment against Milosevic 
should not be examined solely within the context of the ICTY. It 
needs to be appreciated in a dimension beyond the ICTY because it 
was the first time that an international indictment was brought against 
a sitting Head of State. 
The ramifications of such a bold step may be associated with 
other cases, including the ICC case against the Sudanese President Al-
Bashir—who is no longer in power. The two examples presented out 
of the ICTY’s experience seem to prove that “peace” and “justice” are 
notions that do not have to be regarded as contradictory or 
irreconcilable. In fact, the idea of positive peace was embraced when 
indicting Karadzic and Mladic: “A peace masterminded by and in 
order to accommodate the concerns of vicious war criminals defiant of 
all fundamental international law prescriptions or norms is no such 
effective or enduring peace.”166 
A similar tension between “peace” and “justice” arose in the 
context of the SCSL when the Prosecutor David Crane unsealed the 
indictment of then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, while Taylor 
was attending preliminary peace talks aimed at ending the Liberian 
civil war in Accra (Ghana) in August 2003. Although this was 
qualified by the Secretary of the Organization of West States, 
Mohamed Ibn Chambas, as putting a “‘damper on the 
negotiations,’”167 the immediate effect was that Taylor abandoned the 
peace conference and rapidly returned to Liberia.168 This indictment 
was perceived as transforming that peace conference into a serious 
peace-making process and Taylor “was effectively delegitimized, 
marginalized and removed from any role in a future political 
settlement. After [two and a half] months the Ghana peace talks 
 
166. Richard Goldstone, Bringing War Criminals to Justice during Ongoing 
War, in HARD CHOICES, MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 195, 
204 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998). 
167. James Goldston, More Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of 
Discretion by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 
383, 399 n.74 (2010) (quoting V. Lasch, Liberian President indicted for war crimes, 
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produced a comprehensive agreement.”169 Further, “Peace Talks for 
Liberia . . . were directly strengthened and invigorated by [Taylor’s 
indictment].”170 As discussed above, however, it is important not to 
jump to conclusions. Even though that indictment contributed to 
forcing Taylor out of office by eroding his demands to continue in the 
Presidency, it can hardly be argued that the indictment alone forced 
Taylor out of office.171   
At this point, this Article examines how the contribution of the 
ICC’s prosecution to the peace-processes in the country-situations 
went through the analysis of the first situation at the ICC, namely 
Uganda, as complemented with some references to one of the longest 
standing situations at the ICC, namely, Darfur (Sudan). Considering 
that the ICC in January 2004 announced the opening of its 
investigation concerning crimes allegedly committed in Uganda, the 
ICC’s first impact may be traced back to the “Betty Bigombe” peace 
negotiation process, which peaked from December 2004 to February 
2005.172 This can be read as LRA leaders considering both the 
opening of the Ugandan situation and its potential individual cases 
because they approached the Ugandan government in peace-
negotiations.173 
Even though the ICC Prosecutor adopted a “low profile” 
approach,174 there was a lot of controversy, voiced through the peace 
first, justice later175 demand, which evidences the importance of 
considering not only whether to take the decision to indict but also 
 
169. Priscilla Hayner, Seeking Justice as War Crimes Rage On, CHI. TRIB., 
Jun. 16, 2008, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2008-07-16-
0807150373-story.html  (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
170. Id. 
171. ICTJ, supra note 27, at 7. 
172. See Betty Bigome: The woman who befriended a warlord, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49269136; see also Betty 
Bigome: Building Peace in Uganda, U.S. INST. PEACE, https://www.usip.org/public-
education/educators/betty-bigombe-building-peace-uganda (last visited Feb. 18, 
2021). 
173. ICTJ, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
174. ID. at 5. 
175. See generally REFUGEE LAW PROJECT, WHOSE JUSTICE? PERCEPTIONS OF 
UGANDA’S AMNESTY ACT 2000: THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND 
LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION (Refugee Law Project, Working Paper No. 15, Feb. 
2005) (As an example of a critical position towards the ICC). 
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when to do so. Nevertheless, the ICC and its Prosecutor deserve credit 
for actually waiting for the outcome of the Betty Bigombe process 
(which failed in 2005) before deciding to unseal the arrest warrants 
against the LRA leaders in October 2005.176 Although in the case 
phase, it is arguable that the ICC arrest warrants were an important 
factor to make the LRA engage in new negotiations with the Ugandan 
government, leading to the signature of the first Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement on August 26, 2006. Yet, the subsequent 
negotiations as part of the “Juba”177 process were marked by the 
LRA’s pressure over the Ugandan government concerning the 
withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants and the grant of amnesties as 
conditions to reach peace.178 
In any event, the Juba process failed, but, at the same time, 
relative peace returned to northern Uganda and the internally 
displaced persons have returned in a widespread manner. However, 
Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda soundly point out that the 
contribution of the ICC’s prosecutions of the LRA leaders to such an 
outcome is only one factor, and it was not even the main one, but: 
“what is much clearer is that the ICC arrest warrants had a significant 
impact on the contents of the negotiation and on the accountability 
agreement in particular.”179 This also corresponds to the lack of a 
specific doctrine on deterrence or prevention of crime in the ICC-
OTP’s policy because proof of the link between prevention of crimes 
and the ICC’s action may be very complicated.180 All in all, as of 
2019, Uganda is not at risk of armed violence on the scale of the 
armed conflicts that affected Uganda in the 1980s or the armed 
conflict against the LRA which took place in the 1990s and 2000s.181 
 
176. ICTJ, supra note 27, at 5. 
177. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Juba Peace Agreement (Sudan), U.N. Press Release SC/14323 (Oct. 5, 2020) 
(discussing the Juba Peace Agreement). 
178. OTIM & WIERDA, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
179. ID. at 5. 
180. ICTJ, supra note 27, at 6. 
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Concerning the situation in Darfur, the ICC’s intervention 
arguably changed the balance of power between the Sudanese 
government and the Justice and Equality Movement (“JEM”).182 This 
is illustrated by the following incidents. First, knowing that the ICC 
would make public its decision on the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir 
on March 4, 2009, the Sudanese government concluded a “Goodwill 
and Confidence-Building Agreement to Resolve Darfur Conflict” with 
the JEM on February 17, 2009.183 Second, by building upon that 
Agreement, the other rebel group the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(“SLM”)—later renamed Liberation and Justice Movement 
(“LJM”)—joined the negotiations leading the government to sign two 
separate agreements with the JEM and the LJM in mid-February and 
mid-March 2010 respectively.184 In the end, South Sudan became a 
new state in July 2011.185 In turn, it is expected that the post-Bashir 
landscape enhances the maintenance of a society free of armed 
conflicts in Sudan.186   
The two examples provided show that the ICC has, at minimum, 
indirectly impacted moving forward to either peace negotiations or a 
decrease in hostilities. Nevertheless, the ICC should not be 
misunderstood as a panacea to solve many problems of “peace” and 
“justice” in the ICC situations. Even just considering the notion of 
justice, the ICC is only one among many mechanisms to be weighed 
in transitional justice scenarios since “justice” is identified in the 
Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice: “combines elements of 
criminal justice, truth-seeking, reparations and institutional reform as 
well as the fair distribution of, and access to, public goods and equity 
within society at large.”187 
 
182. See BALDO, supra note 81, at 2. 
183. Id. at 6. 
184. Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New 
Nation, N. Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html. 
185. Id. 
186. See, e.g., Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 
21, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/281-safeguarding-
sudans-revolution. 
187. Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, supra note 153, at 4.   
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B. The ICC and Amnesties 
Unlike the “provisions on prohibitions on”/”lack of effect of 
amnesties” contained in the ECCC Law, the SCSL, and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon Statutes,188 the ICC Statute contains no explicit 
mention concerning the relationship between the ICC and national 
amnesties related to cases before it. In any event, and with regard to 
the ICC’s work, attention must be primarily drawn to cases where 
national amnesties include the persons most responsible for 
international crimes, i.e., those targetable by the ICC regardless of 
what may be situation concerning intermediate and low-ranked 
perpetrators. However, when discussing whether the ICC may defer to 
national amnesties, some scholars include an assessment of whether 
states are obligated by international law to prosecute international 
crimes.189 Once it is concluded that international law binds the state 
with the duty to prosecute international crimes, national amnesties 
should be inapplicable, which would facilitate the ICC’s actions. 
Nonetheless, such a premise is unfortunate because, even considering 
the existence of such a state obligation as for crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, it does not mean that the ICC shall automatically take 
over that duty.190   
As emphasized above, the ICC’s mandate is highly specialized 
and limited by the “persons most responsible” criterion (i.e., only a 
reduced number of situations and individual cases will be investigated, 
prosecuted, and tried by the ICC).191 This point is intrinsically 
connected with the ICC Statute’s recognition of the ICC-Prosecutor’s 
discretion192 even in cases where the jurisdiction and admissibility 
requirements are met. These points, when analyzing the ICC’s 
 
188. Compare Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia Oct. 27, 2004, art. 40new (Cambodia), with S.C. Res. 1315, 
(Aug. 14, 2000), art. 10, and S.C. Res. 1757, Statute of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon Statute, art. 16 (May 30, 2007). 
189. See generally Drazan Dukic, Transitional justice and the International 
Criminal Court-in “the interests of justice”? 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 691–718 
(2007). 
190. STIGEN, supra note 31, at 431. 
191. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
192. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c). 
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intervention vis-à-vis national amnesties, should lead to consider that: 
“even if amnesties per se were considered as illegal under 
international law, the ICC would be under no duty to interfere.”193 
This has been implicitly reckoned by the ICC-OTP when analyzing 
the compatibility of amnesties with the ICC Statute’s principle of 
complementarity: “the ICC is entrusted with a specific Statute 
mandate to help ensure that the most serious crimes do not go 
unpunished.”194 
As previously detailed, the “persons most responsible” criterion 
sheds light on the nature of the most serious crimes referred to in the 
ICC Statute. This criterion was identified as a critical factor by the 
ICC-OTP’s informal expert paper in evaluating the relationship 
between the ICC and national amnesties via this question: “Are 
conditional amnesties/alternative measures made available only to 
lower-ranked offenders? Or, are they available to the persons most 
responsible (PMR)?”195 Moreover, the ICC-OTP’s informal expert 
paper explicitly acknowledges that amnesties which exonerate those 
lower-ranked perpetrators are not incompatible with the ICC; 
however, it was expressed a different approach when amnesty’s 
personal scope includes those considered as the most responsible for 
international crimes: 
There may be logistical, moral, and legal grounds to treat lesser 
offenders through alternative measures [e.g., amnesties] –
particularly following mass crimes where the number of offenders 
is overwhelming- but it is more problematic where PMR obtain 
lenient treatment. The ICC may properly focus on the PMR and be 
more prepared to insist on prosecution, and yet have less reason to 
intervene in the handling of lesser offences by recovering 
societies.196  
Even though granting amnesties to lower-ranked perpetrators 
normally raises some controversy, this Article considers that the grant 
of amnesties corresponds to their use as a transitional justice 
mechanism alongside criminal prosecutions, reparations, truth seeking 
 
193. STIGEN, supra note 31, at 432. 
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mechanisms, lustration, etc. ICC prosecutions need to be regarded as 
only a transitional justice tool within the myriad of other mechanisms 
designed to balance peace and justice. This underlying idea arguably 
shed light on the approach adopted by the AU High-Level Panel on 
Darfur (“AUPD”). Accordingly, the AUPD did not challenge the 
ICC’s jurisdiction as the AUPD embedded the ICC’s actions within a 
comprehensive and holistic transitional justice approach. The ICC was 
therefore regarded as “a court of last resort, which complements the 
national judicial systems. It is also a court of limited capacity.”197  
 
Among other measures to promote justice and reconciliation, the 
AUPD recommended the constitution of a truth, justice and 
reconciliation Commission—pardon-granting power where 
appropriate included—and a hybrid tribunal with competence over 
the most serious crimes.198 
Concerning the legal principles relating to amnesties, the SCSL, 
for example, only dealt with amnesties as a preliminary/incidental 
question before it considered properly the merits of the case.199 The 
same can be mutatis mutandis said about the ECCC.200 It is inaccurate 
to fall to the temptation of mechanically extrapolating human rights 
monitoring bodies’/regional courts’ case-law regarding the legality of 
national amnesties to the realm of international criminal justice 
institutions .201  This is because those bodies/courts establish state 
 
197. African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur [AUPD], Report of the 
African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), 91, ¶ 339 (Oct. 
29, 2009). 
198. Id. ¶ 25. 
199. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-
AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Special 
Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL], (Mar. 13, 2004), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2004.03.13_Prosecutor_v_Kallon_
Kamara.pdf. 
200. See Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 
Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections, Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia [ECCC],  ¶¶ 37–53 (Nov. 3, 2011), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/E51_15_EN.PDF. 
201. See generally Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C.) No. 75 (Nov. 30, 2001), 
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responsibility (whether or not the state in question has violated its 
obligation to prosecute serious human rights violations by passing or 
implementing amnesty laws). 
Nevertheless, the ICC’s mandate is limited to criminal liability of 
individuals who are regarded as the most responsible for international 
crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Precisely, the rest of this sub-
section addresses whether, in a scenario where the persons most 
responsible for the said crimes benefit from an amnesty, an exception 
to the ICC’s competence may be invoked. As a matter of principle, 
national amnesties whose personal scope includes the “persons most 
responsible” for international crimes directly overlap with the ICC’s 
personal scope. As explained above, there is a general consensus, 
based upon legal, moral, and pragmatic arguments, about the necessity 
of prosecuting and trying those who are “the most responsible” either 
at the national or the international level while, eventually, sparing 
lower-level perpetrators from prosecution.202 
An avenue considered by some scholars as the most important 
with respect to a potential amnesty exception is Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute.203 Accordingly, the Security Council holds the legal authority 
to request the ICC to respect an amnesty—which may include the 
most senior perpetrators—thereby prohibiting the commencement of 
an investigation or prosecution deferring any proceedings already 
under way. This has to meet two requirements: (1) the determination 
of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter;204 and (2) the resolution 
requesting the ICC’s deferral has to be consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the UN listed under Article 24 of the UN Charter.205 
However, the second requirement may cause difficulties in terms of a 
potential tension between two purposes and principles of the UN, 
namely: (1) maintenance of international peace and security and (2) 
the promotion and respect for human rights and fundamental 
 
https://iachr.lls.edu/sites/default/files/iachr/Cases/Barrios_Altos_v_Peru/benson_bar
rios_altos_v._peru.pdf.   
202. See supra Section III.B. 
203. Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 522 (1999).   
204. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
205. U.N. Charter art. 24, paras. 1–7. 
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freedoms.206 Thus, deferring an ICC case that, almost by definition, 
targets the persons who are the most responsible for the most serious 
crimes is not coherent with one of the UN purposes and principles. 
Even if this obstacle is circumvented, the so-called “compétence 
de la competence” (Kompetenz-Kompetenz),207 may provide the ICC 
a means not to follow the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, the 
hierarchical superiority of the Security Council’s resolutions, which 
stems from the UN Charter,208 over the ICC Statute would probably 
prevail. Be that as it may, Article 16 can only defer the investigation 
or prosecution of the most responsible individuals up to a renewable 
twelve-month period.209 
Regardless, a majority of votes of the UN Security Council is 
needed to obtain the said renewal, but this may be difficult in practice. 
In actuality, concerning the most responsible persons, the AU tried 
unsuccessfully to trigger Article 16, following the announcement by 
the ICC Prosecutor that he was seeking an arrest warrant against the 
then-President of Sudan. The AU called upon the UN Security 
Council to apply Article 16 and “defer the process initiated by the 
ICC”.210 Moreover, the AU’s subsequent call to apply Article 16 after 
the issuance of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir was also 
unsuccessful.211 By taking into account these outcomes, it is likely 
that the UN Security Council would hardly defer the ICC’s 
prosecution of one of the most senior offenders who benefited from an 
amnesty even, if another international organization exerts pressure. 
A second possible exception may exist under Article 53(2)(c) of 
the ICC Statute. This provision refers to the consideration of all the 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the factors explicitly 
listed therein, when the ICC Prosecutor exercises his/her discretion to 
 
206. See U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1, 3; see also U.N. Charter  art. 2, para. 3. 
207. See Scharf, supra note 203, art. 523 (discussing the power of any court to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction). 
208. See U.N. Charter art. 103. 
209. See U.N. Charter art. 16. 
210. AU Peace and Security Council Decision, PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII), ¶¶ 
3, 5, 9, 11(i) (Jul. 21, 2008). 
211. See AU Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of the African States Parties 
to the ICC Statute, at ¶¶ 9–10, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (Jul. 3, 2009). 
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take the decision to prosecute.212 It has been suggested the existence 
of an “exception of necessity” when a state faces a “grave and 
imminent threat,” which governments would not be required “to press 
prosecution to the point of provoking their own collapse.”213 The 
question would be whether it is correct to extrapolate that conclusion 
from the realm of national criminal prosecution to the international 
level, especially in light of the ICC’s highly-specialized mandate. 
The analysis definitely has to be conducted on a case-by-case 
basis. The solution, in principle, negative unless amnesties, which 
include those most responsible, are adopted in scenarios where it is 
highly likely that the ICC’s prosecutions will immediately and 
unavoidably trigger a humanitarian crisis the likes of 1994 Rwanda.214 
In other words, the “exception of necessity” must be construed very 
narrowly under a high threshold. Otherwise, governments may distort 
the “exception of necessity” as a blackmailing strategy to, among 
other things, grant amnesties and shield the most responsible offenders 
from justice. This is the manner in which the said exception may be 
regarded as a decisive circumstance not to prosecute the individuals 
who are most responsible for international crimes, and an 
implementation consistent with the phrasing of Article 53(2)(c) of the 
ICC Statute, which contains an open-ended clause on prosecutorial 
discretion: “A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including . . . .”215 
Another possible exception may exist when the absence of 
amnesties shielding the “persons most responsible” has no impact on 
the feasibility of prosecuting them due to extreme difficulties to meet 
evidentiary thresholds. Nevertheless, this scenario is arguably much 
more controversial than the previous one because the existence of 
enough direct and/or circumstantial evidence to find an accused guilty 
beyond any reasonable doubt is, by definition, determined only during 
trial. The only counter-argument may be some pragmatic approach 
wherein the ICC-OTP uses its scarce resources to pursue cases where 
it has better chances to succeed. This means that, even among cases 
 
212. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c). 
213. Orentlicher, supra note 151, at 2548. 
214. See Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506. 
215. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c). 
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involving the “persons most responsible,” the ICC-OTP should select 
cases regarded as truly potentially successful, which requires the ICC 
Prosecutor to thoroughly evaluate the evidence at hand. 
As part of its guiding criteria to assess national amnesties, the 
ICC-OTP’s informal expert paper has considered additional factors 
other than the “persons most responsible” criterion.216 However, if 
those factors prove to be difficult when it comes to amnesties as 
applied to lesser perpetrators, the acceptance as for the most 
responsible offenders seems to be extremely unlikely. One factor, 
“international legitimation,”217 would barely be present, if at all, in 
cases of amnesties such as sweeping or blanket amnesties. For 
example, the Lomé agreement for Sierra Leone, which included the 
persons most responsible for international crimes. Nor would self-
amnesty laws be given such legitimacy as the laws in Argentina, 
Chile, or Peru, which were passed by dictatorial regimes to exonerate 
themselves from criminal liability.218   
There is a firm trend in the international community, particularly 
at the UN’s policy level, to be more reluctant to amnesties that include 
international crimes, as observed by the UN Secretary General: 
“Ensure that peace agreements and Security Council resolutions and 
mandates . . . reject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity . . . ensure that no such amnesty 
previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United Nations-
created or assisted court.”219 The last part of this quote is particularly 
relevant because the UN created and/or assisted those courts to 
precisely deal with the persons most responsible for international 
crimes as the ICC does. Therefore, amnesties that protect these 
 
216. ICC-OTP, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 9 at 13–15. 
217. Id. at 23. 
218. See Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Jun. 14, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/14/argentina-amnesty-laws-
struck-down (Argentina); see also Guadalupe Marengo, Chile: Amnesty law keeps 
Pinochet’s legacy alive, AMNESTY.ORG (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/chile-amnesty-law-keeps-pinochet-
s-legacy-alive/ (Chile); Lisa J. Lapante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal 
Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 916, 944–55 (Peru). 
219. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, ¶ 64(c), U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
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individuals should not be considered legitimate and the ICC-OTP 
should intervene, provided the admissibility test is met and the 
interests of justice so demand. 
The last possible avenue to invoke an exception to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction in context of amnesties involving the ‘persons most 
responsible’ is the prohibition of double jeopardy or “ne bis in 
idem,”220 which the ICC Statute phrases as follows: 
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also 
proscribed under articles 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with 
respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the court: (a) 
Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or 
impartially . . . .221   
The accused, including the most responsible offenders, could 
argue that their confessions before an amnesty-granting truth 
commission was equivalent to being tried and convicted of the same 
offense they are currently charged with at the ICC.222 As Michael 
Scharf has remarked, however, there are two issues with Article 20(3) 
of the ICC Statute that present problems in cases of the most 
responsible offenders: (1) it refers to a trial by “another court,” which 
a truth commission is not; and (2) Article 20 is not applicable to 
proceedings that are “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.” 223 
In terms of practice, the ICC in the case of Saif Gaddafi has 
provided some analysis of the relationship between national amnesties 
and admissibility of cases at the ICC. In March 2020, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber224 confirmed most of the amnesty-related findings of the 
 
220. Non bis in idem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (19th ed. 2019) (“Not twice 
for the same thing.”). 
221. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3). 
222. See Scharf, supra note 203, at 525 (quoting Int’l Crim. Ct., Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(2), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (July 17, 
1998)). 
223. Id. 
224. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-695, Appeal of 
Gaddafi Against decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the 
‘Admissibility Challenge by Dr. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 
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ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.225 First, a Libyan amnesty law (Law 6/2015) 
was not applicable to the accused because this law explicitly excluded 
the crimes alleged against him.226 In other words, the Gaddafi’s self-
protecting law was inapplicable in the ICC. Second, Law 6/2015 lays 
down conditions requiring applicants to manifest repentance, adopt 
steps to reconcile with victims, and commit not to re-offend, all of 
which were not met.227 Third, the Law 6/2015 requires a competent 
judicial authority to render a reasoned decision terminating the 
criminal proceedings against the accused, which Gaddafi did not 
show.228 
As for the compatibility of the Libyan amnesty law with 
international law, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Gaddafi found that 
“there is a strong, growing, universal tendency that grave and 
systematic human rights violations – which may amount to crimes 
against humanity by their very nature – are not subject to amnesties or 
pardons under international law.”229 Nevertheless, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber considered that this matter is not settled, and “[f]or present 
purposes, it suffices to say only that international law is still in the 
developmental stage on the question of acceptability of amnesties . . . . 
In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber will not dwell on the 
matter further.”230   
Lastly, it is important to examine how pardons fit into this 
scheme. Amnesties and pardons are different; the latter, in words of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, are: “an official act 
that exempts a convicted criminal or criminals from serving his, her or 
 
19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute’”, ¶ 3 (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00904.PDF [hereinafter Gaddafi Appeal]. 
225. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-662, Decision on the 
“Admissibility Challenge by Dr. Saif Al-Islam Gadafi pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 
19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute,” ¶ 57 (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_01904.PDF [hereinafter Gaddafi Decision]. 
226. See Gaddafi Appeal, ¶¶ 85–95; see also Gaddafi Decision,  ¶¶ 56–60. 
227. See id. 
228. Id. 
229. Gaddafi Decision, ¶ 61. 
230. Gaddafi Appeal, ¶ 96. 
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their sentences.”231 Pardons do not face the first problem noted above 
because there was actually a criminal conviction by a court. The 
second problem regarding inconsistency of proceedings must be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. However, a pardon still stands a 
chance to prevent the ICC’s jurisdiction, even in cases concerning the 
most responsible offenders because “unlike amnesties, pardons are not 
ambiguous about the guilt of the recipient . . . . Pardons thus remove 
punishment, but unlike amnesties, do not disturb the accountability 
and truth functions of justice.”232 
CONCLUSION 
First, the ICC’s mandate, as an international criminal tribunal, is 
limited to the determination of criminal liability of those accused of 
committing crimes under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, when the ICC 
Prosecutor and the ICC Chambers assess whether the principle of 
complementarity has been triggered, it is not part of their mandate to 
fully evaluate the respective national system. That matter is reserved 
to human rights bodies. 
Also, as the ICC Prosecutor holds a legal rather than a political 
mandate, he/she has no obligation to privilege considerations of peace 
and security over justice when deciding whether to prosecute an 
individual. This is because the ICC’s mandate is not to maintain 
international peace and security, which corresponds to institutions 
such as the Security Council. The ICC’s mandate is part of the “Rome 
System of Justice,” which has the State Parties to the ICC Statute as 
key actors. 
In light of a positive complementarity approach to the relationship 
between the ICC and national jurisdictions, the ICC is only a court of 
last resort, which is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, 
although the ICC should/may encourage and/or assist national 
prosecutions. Such a positive complementary approach, however, 
cannot be exaggerated because the ICC has no obligation to 
encourage/assist (especially in “unable” state scenarios) a state to 
 
231. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law 
Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, 43,  HR/PUB/09/1 (2009). 
232. Ronald Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and 
General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 
VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 235–236 (2002). 
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investigate and prosecute the generality of cases which are in principle 
outside the ICC’s admissibility. The ICC needs to increasingly engage 
into a division of judicial tasks. This means the ICC prosecutes and 
tries the most responsible/senior individuals through national criminal 
jurisdictions that deal with lesser offenders and/or other transitional 
justice mechanisms in order to avoid an instrumentalization of the ICC 
through self-referrals when a state is indeed able and willing to 
investigate and prosecute. Such a move would better preserve the 
ICC’s scarce resources. 
Second, the difference between the notions of “situation” and 
“case” must be noted in order to identify how much the 
governmental/state reactions may change. States/governments, 
broadly speaking, tend to be cooperative or, at least, not obstructive, 
when there is only an ongoing investigation into the general context of 
a “situation” at the ICC. 
However, once the ICC Prosecutor moves from the “situation” 
phase to the “case” phase by applying for the issuance of arrest 
warrants or summons to appear and, especially when one accused is a 
high-ranking state officer, the same state/government tends to become 
hostile to the ICC. This change in reaction illustrates the real tension 
takes place not during the investigation into a situation, but when 
individuals are targeted/prosecuted by the ICC. This is intrinsically 
connected with the fact that only a handful of perpetrators are 
prosecuted and tried by the ICC in application of the criterion of ‘the 
persons most responsible’ which is decisive during prosecution. 
Within the framework of the ICC’s prosecutions, if even one of the 
most responsible persons is shield from justice, it does not really 
matter whether a state’s judiciary is overall impeccable, or whether 
other transitional justice mechanisms are properly implemented. 
Accordingly, the ICC will step in provided that the prosecution test is 
met. 
Third, the notions of “peace” and “justice” should be broadly 
understood. A notion of “positive peace” that does not limit peace to 
end violence in the immediate term, and “justice” includes several 
accountability mechanisms and not only prosecution. Bearing in mind 
these distinctions, the ICC may be a tool of peace and justice in a set 
of other transitional justice options. 
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The victims’ perceptions do not accurately conceive peace and 
justice as necessarily irreconcilable and, therefore, the ICC is 
perceived as an instrument to foster both peace and justice. 
Additionally, the misrepresentation of the ICC as a threat to 
peace-building making has generally proved to be unjustified because 
disruptions of peace have neither occurred in similar contexts tackled 
by other international/hybrid criminal tribunals, nor have they clearly 
occurred in the ICC’s practice. Conversely, prosecutions of those who 
are the most responsible offenders have shown to contribute to build 
up positive peace. Nevertheless, the ICC’s role in this peace and 
justice continuum is limited and should not be exaggerated. This is 
illustrated via the relationship between the ICC and national 
amnesties. The ICC, strictly speaking, lacks mandate to evaluate the 
legality of national amnesties provided that they do not shield the 
“persons most responsible for international crimes from justice,” 
namely, those persons who the ICC target. Concerning cases of the 
most responsible offenders, under very exceptional, strict, and specific 
conditions, such as a narrow application of Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute, the exception of necessity or pardon, or the amnesty exception 
might potentially and extraordinarily be invoked to preclude the 
prosecution of a case before the ICC. 
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